Euroopan unionille vuoden 2023 lopulla koittava päätös Georgian jäsenyyshakemuksen hyväksymisestä tai viivästyttämisestä on dilemma, jossa millä tahansa ratkaisulla voi olla kauaskantoisia vaikutuksia.
On March 10, 2023, following widespread protests, the Georgian parliament voted down its proposed bill for a “foreign agents registration system.” Although the bill’s authors cited the United States as a model, internationally, the draft was compared to a law in Russia used to suppress civil society, and it was seen as an existential threat to Georgia’s EU membership aspirations. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused the protesters of seeking a Euromaidan-style change of power.[1] The play of these events symbolizes Georgia’s overall political situation.
Georgia, a partially Russian-occupied neighbor in the Caucasus, was one of three countries that applied for EU membership shortly after Russia launched a large-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Ukraine’s defense struggle stirred broad sympathies in the pro-European nation, which had also been a target of Russian military actions in 2008. When the European Commission accepted Moldova and Ukraine as candidates in 2022, it set a list of 12 reforms for Georgia to implement.[2]
By April 2023, a record 89% of Georgians supported the EU membership goal. [3] Although once considered a model student of the EU’s Eastern Partnership, Georgia’s state of democracy has deteriorated in recent years, posing a threat to its EU aspirations.[4] The Georgian Dream party, founded by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia, has held power for over a decade, with Ivanishvili believed to be its undeniable influence.[5] The European Parliament has called for sanctions against Ivanishvili for his role in weakening Georgian democracy.[6]
Georgian politics, throughout its recent independent history, have been characterized by strong leaders, raw political competition, and deep crises. The major parties, including Georgian Dream and its main competitor, the United National Movement (UNM), led by the staunchly pro-Western Mikheil Saakashvili known for democratising Georgia during his tenure, have no significant public ideological differences and are both elite driven. As with the UNM, Georgian Dream’s stated policy is rapid EU and NATO integration but in addition, the normalization of relations with Russia.[7]
Ivanishvili’s “strategic patience” approach towards Russia is justified as taking a pragmatic stance on dealing with a massive neighbour, providing the stability needed for Western integration. However, Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili’s tenure has raised questions about the party’s genuine commitment to European integration and whether it has been deliberately sabotaged.[8] [9]
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Garibashvili has been reluctant to participate in economic sanctions against Russia, making Georgia a significant transit country for Russian goods and trade. Concurrently, Garibashvili has strengthened ties with authoritarian leaders such as China’s Xi, Putin, and Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. His provocative statements on Western foreign policy and liberal democratic values have strained relations with the EU and traditional NATO allies.[10] [11]
While the Georgian public almost unanimously awaits inclusion in the community of European democracies, the government, despite its promises,[12] is steering the country in nearly the opposite direction, potentially turning Georgia into a Russian foothold in the Caucasus.
Political polarization, oligarchic power, and politicians’ control over media are issues the EU has deemed prerequisites for granting candidate status.[13] Addressing these would require significant concessions from the ruling party and its influencers. The debate has been fiery, and in September, the Georgian parliament’s speaker accused Georgian officials of Ukrainian descent of planning a revolution in Georgia if the EU rejects its candidacy.[14]
The decision facing the European Union at the end of 2023, to accept or delay Georgia’s membership application, is a dilemma with far-reaching implications. The negotiation table will see strategic security objectives, handling a difficult partner, and the EU’s real capacity to convince Georgians that the “European dream” is still something worth pursuing.
SAMUEL TAMMEKANN
[1] Georgia drops foreign agents law after massive protests | AP News
[2] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-06/Georgia%20opinion%20and%20Annex.pdf
[3] IRI Georgia Poll Finds Support for EU Accession High, Weariness of Russian Presence, Lack of Faith in Political Parties | International Republican Institute
[4] https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Georgia-must-get-its-act-together-to-become-an-EU-candidate-country~4f4ad4
[5] https://ecfr.eu/publication/broken-dream-the-oligarch-russia-and-georgias-drift-from-europe/#potential-crises
[6] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/fi/situation-of-the-former-president-of-geo/product-details/20230306DPU35681
[7] https://carnegieendowment.org/files/TdW-AG_Future_of_Georgia_Final_Report_-_Polarization.pdf?ssp=1&darkschemeovr=1&setlang=fi-FI&safesearch=moderate
[8] https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Georgia-must-get-its-act-together-to-become-an-EU-candidate-country~4f4ad4
[9] https://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/674-georgia-terrible-dilemma-for-europe#ancre_10
[10] https://www.voanews.com/a/georgia-s-strategic-relationship-with-china-worries-partners-in-west-/7227496.html
[11] What happened with Georgia’s NATO ambitions? – DW – 07/12/2023
[12] PM claims EU will have “no reasons” ro reject Georgia’s candidacy (frontnews.ge)
[13] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3460
[14] Ukraine has become “shelter” for Georgian “criminals” in high posts – Papuashvili (frontnews.ge)
Weakening democracy: Under the rule of the Georgian Dream party, Georgia’s democracy and rule of law have deteriorated.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Separatist regions that broke away during the violence of the ’90s were recognized as independent by Russia after a brief war in 2008. Russia has fortified the borders of these regions and its influence in their decision-making.
Conflicting objectives: The Georgian government’s real willingness to progress on the path to membership, and the consistency between words and actions, have been questioned.
External political pull: Georgia’s current leadership has been unwilling to participate in EU sanctions against Russia, while Russia’s foothold in the country has grown.
Progress in integration: The EU-Georgia Association Agreement, which came into force in 2016, has provided Georgia access to certain sectors of the European single market and visa-free travel to the EU. Today, the EU is Georgia’s largest trading partner.
Security policy position: EU membership and cooperation in foreign and security policy would strengthen Georgia’s security as a neighbor of Russia and help counter hybrid influence.
Public commitment: Becoming part of the community of European democracies has been a long-term goal of Georgians, enjoying strong public support.
