The integration process is a common journey where too easily attained membership can create inequality among countries. Each member must be able to support the EU’s internal growth and deepening integration. In the coming years, the EU’s sustainability and credibility will be tested in a completely new geopolitical climate.
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are knocking on the EU’s door. At the decisive December 2023 summit, EU leaders decided to open membership negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, while granting Georgia candidate status. The political pressure was intense to grant these steps towards the European family to Ukraine and Moldova, countries under Russian pressure, and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. However, the reality of the possible pace of expansion is quite different. Many experts remind us that EU leaders’ promises of membership for these countries by the turn of the next decade are exaggerated. In the Western Balkans, governments and citizens in North Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, not to mention Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, are well aware of how slow the accession process can be. These countries have been aspiring to join the EU for over twenty years.
There is now a discussion about how the EU’s decision-making system should be reformed to function effectively with the accession of Ukraine and other new member states. The steps of the membership process are also being considered, to ensure that new member states certainly meet the required criteria. However, the question of the sustainability of enlargement policy is not only related to measuring the eligibility of candidate countries and the readiness of EU structures to integrate new members but also how citizens in both the EU and the applicant countries are emotionally prepared to accept the changes, problems, and disappointments inevitably encountered in the expansion process.
While membership negotiations are quite technical, their progress, hindrance, and outcomes depend on political will. When the issue of membership eventually comes to the decision of EU countries, public opinion will play a central role. If the will is that the enlargement policy is to be credible, not only EU leaders but also the political leadership of current member states should take a clear public stance in favor of enlargement within the EU. At the same time, it is important to openly inform citizens of the applicant countries in time about a process that may slow down or even reach a deadlock (as in the negotiations with Turkey), instead of making baseless promises.
After the fall of communism, Central and Eastern European countries turned their eyes towards the EU. The first members to join the EU after this political shift in 1995 were the non-aligned countries Finland, Sweden, and Austria. The Copenhagen criteria, decided at the summit in 1993, formed the basis of the enlargement process, culminating in 2004 with the accession of ten countries to the EU, including Slovenia as the only former Yugoslav republic.
The EU also sought to reform its structures under the 2000s enlargement wave. The proposal for a Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, drafted by the European Convention (Convent), ultimately led to negative referendums in France and the Netherlands. Enlargement fatigue was blamed for the citizens’ anti-EU views. Focus shifted to the economic crisis and away from enlargement. “Pacta sunt servanda” – promises must be kept – was the motto of then Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, and the expansion did not completely stop. The ten Eastern and Central European countries were followed by the Eastern Balkan countries Bulgaria and Romania (2007), who were subject to a special rule of law monitoring mechanism, and Croatia (2013) as the next former Yugoslav country. Other Western Balkan countries remained waiting their turn.
To the current Commission, one might say “festina lente” – hasten slowly – and warn against too hasty promises that may not have a basis in reality if EU citizens turn against enlargement upon realizing Ukraine’s size and the price tag of expansion, or if EU structures cannot be reformed in positive consensus. Will the large member states really adapt to a new situation where a member state as large as Ukraine suddenly has significant decision-making power alongside founding members France and Germany? And who else would still remain on the waiting list: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as the last question marks in the Balkans? And what about Armenia, slowly stepping away from Russia’s sphere of influence in the cross-pressure of Turkey and Azerbaijan, currently resettling over a hundred thousand evacuees from the Nagorno-Karabakh region? Does the EU have the capacity to take greater responsibility for the future of regions like the South Caucasus if membership negotiations with Georgia open one day? Finding a common foreign policy voice already seems almost impossible amidst the cross-pressures of different internal political demands and economic interests. The member states and the summit in December 2023 have had and will continue to have a great responsibility in pondering these questions.
The remaining Balkan countries waiting outside the EU are expected to gradually fulfill the conditions for membership. North Macedonia received candidate status in 2005, Montenegro in 2010, Serbia in 2012, Albania in 2014, and finally Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 2022. Kosovo has only been given an EU membership perspective. The reputation of the Balkans as an unstable region has been quite a hard piece to swallow for many EU countries in the enlargement discussion, but national interests and bilateral problems have also emerged as obstacles to enlargement. Also, bordering EU member states that have already joined have the full ability to slow down the procession of candidate countries in their road to the EU.
North Macedonia was granted candidate status a few years after the Ohrid Agreements to pacify the situation between the Albanian minority and the Slavic majority. Although the EU Commission recommended opening negotiations from 2009, a dispute with Greece over the country’s name prevented membership talks until 2020, after Macedonia had changed its name to North Macedonia in the previous year. Now, another neighbour, Bulgaria, has found its chance in the enlargement negotiations to push forward its national interests, preventing North Macedonia from getting forward in membership talks. No negotiation chapters have been opened yet. Albania, similar in size to North Macedonia, officially started negotiations only in 2022. Greece has its interests concerning the country’s small Greek minority, so neither Albania goes without challenges alongside its neighbour in the EU.
Serbia, inheriting the administrative structures of the former Yugoslavia, which also had Belgrade as its capital, initially had the best chances for rapid progress in meeting membership criteria. However, Serbia was in an unfavourable position during the Yugoslav Wars, and EU membership has not been the biggest dream of its citizens in recent years. Serbians, feeling that Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008, belongs to Serbia, consistently vote for a nationalist government that has not joined the EU’s foreign policy lines against Russia nor the sanctions against Russia even after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Negotiations, however, have progressed since their opening in 2014, with over half of the negotiation chapters now opened. Tiny Montenegro, with a population of 600,000 divided between independence supporters and Serbia sympathizers, began negotiations in 2012, having now opened all 33 chapters and provisionally having already closed three.
On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina, which suffered the most during the Yugoslav Wars (with Sarajevo besieged for nearly four years and over a hundred thousand people killed in the Bosnian War), is in a very challenging situation. The multi-layered federal structure created by the Dayton Peace Agreement seems it might be incapable of meeting the demands set by the enlargement negotiations. Still, the European Council has decided to open membership negotiations once significant legal reforms are made. The constitution created by the peace agreement has already been deemed contrary to EU human rights standards, as political leadership positions are accessible only to representatives of the three major nations (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks). This division of power that ended the violence among these groups remains, and they are not ready to reform their governance structure in a way that would take away the political rights promised to the nations. Additionally, a part of the federal system leaning towards Serbia and Russia, Republika Srpska, also known as the Bosnian Serb Republic, is clearly reluctant to embark on the EU path, and its leaders are trying to weaken the federal structures in various ways. The EU granted candidate status to the country last year but remains incapable of calming the internal political situation and strengthening state unity.
Kosovo is another example of a Balkan state without a credible EU membership perspective, despite the official EU rhetoric. Five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, leading to the impossibility of finding a common stance on Kosovo. Consequently, Kosovo’s Albanian-majority leadership has no political pressure to heed EU instructions beyond their own interests. At the same time, extremist elements among the country’s Serbian minority seek to destabilize the young state. However, the EU paths of Serbia and Kosovo are linked in the so-called “normalization process,” with both countries’ progress (albeit unequal, as one negotiates for membership and the other lacks even a candidate status) linked to this process. Serbia is not required to recognize Kosovo’s independence (as there are also five member states that do not recognize it) but is expected not to hinder Kosovo’s accession to international organizations. The wait remains for both countries to reach negotiated solutions in various practical matters. The negotiations continue.
The EU’s deliberately slow-paced enlargement strategy could have continued if it was not for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Four days later, Ukraine applied for EU membership and was granted candidate status in June 2022 at the European Council. Not wanting to be left behind by Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia submitted their membership applications in March 2022. Under the shadow of Russian aggression, Moldova was given candidate status alongside Ukraine, while Georgia was promised the same upon completing a list of required reforms. The next steps were taken at the December 2023 European Council, which greenlighted membership negotiations for Ukraine and Moldova.
The EU has not clearly stated how it will resolve the membership issue with these three countries, considering there are parts of their territories they do not directly control. The Transnistrian region of Moldova still hosts Russian military forces and Soviet-inherited arms depots. Belonging to the Russian sphere, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have significantly diverged from their mother country Georgia, and no one has a credible estimate for their future. Russia’s foreign policy aim has been to keep the former Soviet republics within its sphere of influence, and many interpret Russia’s military actions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (from 2014) as attempts to prevent these countries from moving closer to NATO and the EU. However, this intimidation has led to an entirely different outcome.
The rhetoric around the EU’s enlargement agenda has clearly shifted towards a more realistic and geopolitically focused direction. Previously, the EU employed strict conditionality policy even when deciding on candidate status, but now the order has changed, with the candidate status of these three countries struggling against Russia’s sphere of influence being seen as an important political message signalling their stronger shift towards an EU sphere. However, this political message might raise false and exaggerated expectations in the new candidate countries. The understanding that the start of EU membership negotiations does not equate to rapid integration is very limited among citizens. Mismatched expectations in the candidate countries can lead to growing internal conflicts. For instance, in Moldova, about a third of the population is not in favour of EU membership, although the country is currently governed by a very EU-friendly administration. Georgians are largely pro-EU, but the government does not seem fully motivated to implement the required reforms, which will likely affect the social order in the future. Ukrainians are focused on winning the war, but unfounded beliefs in a rapid EU membership post-war could increase support for extremist elements when hopes are not realized.
For the past decade, little was said about EU expansion. After Croatia’s accession in 2013, focus shifted to the process leading to the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union in 2020. The then-Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker declared at the start of his five-year term in 2014 that no new members would be admitted during his tenure. Prior to the war in Ukraine, the EU was more preoccupied with internal political challenges, such as the refugee crisis.
In the new geopolitical context, as the countries of the Eastern Partnership seek to accelerate their approach towards the EU, the Union finds itself in a position where it must thoroughly reevaluate its relationships in the east. Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are soon to start membership negotiations. Even Armenia, previously reliant on Russia, now hosts the EU’s civilian crisis management mission EUMA following the 2020 war with Azerbaijan, although the country still belongs to the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization. Azerbaijan, with its very narrow cooperation agreement with the EU, has become a crucial energy supplier, particularly for a few EU member states, making it difficult for the EU to take a firm stance against Azerbaijan, despite the recent armed displacement of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh.
In her State of the Union speech in September 2022, the current European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reminded that the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are part of the same family, and the EU is not complete without their membership.1 European Council President Charles Michel has reinforced this message by striving to make the enlargement process more dynamic. He has boldly suggested timelines to encourage reform policies in the candidate countries, stating in his speech2 in August 2023 to the Western Balkan countries that “both sides should be ready for enlargement by 2030.” Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi also believes Ukraine could join the EU before 2030,3 but real commitment is needed: Ukraine must meet the criteria, and the EU must complete its internal structural reforms.
While the current leadership of France and Germany supports the enlargement agenda and has made clear proposals4 on how to proceed, Commission President von der Leyen does not want to define a timeline for when Ukraine or the other candidate countries might join. In Finland, there is still a strong belief in the policy of conditionality, even though expansion is seen as a “geopolitical necessity.”5 Not all member states share this optimism. As negotiations progress, bilateral issues will come to the fore. An early taste of this was in spring 2022 when Poland raised concerns about the cheap Ukrainian grain arriving in the internal market.6 Agriculture policy, along with many other policy areas, will require deep reforms if a large country like Ukraine would join the union. In addition, many current net recipients would then become net payers. Are the countries from the previous wave of expansion, accustomed to strong EU support, ready to relinquish that status?
When discussing EU enlargement, the credibility of the EU often comes into question. Do the promises made at the EU level to the candidate countries hold up? Is the process overly susceptible to political machinations, as seen in neighbouring countries exerting pressure on the Balkan states, or the geopolitical necessity to expedite the process for Ukraine and Moldova? When bilateral conflicts are absent, some member states appear ready to flex interpretations of membership criteria, while others emphasize a strict merit-based approach. It’s also clear that for some member states, supporting the global South is as crucial as relations with Eastern and Southeastern Europe. Predicting the outcomes of the December summit was particularly challenging, illustrating the political nature of EU decisions. Not all steps are indeed based on fulfilling well-defined criteria; political will has always played a significant role in EU enlargement, whether it was France’s obstruction of the UK’s membership in the 1960s or the rapid integration of Greece and Spain in the 1970s to bolster their fragile transitioning democracies.
Still, plainly accepting that the enlargement agenda is purely Realpolitik risks discrediting an important tool of the EU since the 1990s to drive of reforms and guide for democracy, human rights, rule of law, and market economy development in candidate countries. The merit- and conditionality-based approach has proven its worth with the latest wave of enlargement. The development of Central and Eastern Europe serves as a key example of how the gradual negotiation process prepared these countries for the internal EU competition and enabled balanced integration and sustainable development for the new member states. Too rapid integration can cause significant difficulties, such as hampering the competitiveness of businesses in new member states. Corruption must also be effectively eradicated from governance structures before membership.
It’s crucial that the membership requirements are clear not only to officials at the negotiation tables but also to the citizens of candidate countries. Citizens must demand reforms from their governments if there is genuine will for EU membership. However, many of these reforms are not easy or immediately appealing to the broader public. The price of EU membership must be understood by the electorate. Slow processes and unpopular reforms can elevate extremist or populist anti-EU voices in elections. While the EU should not, by any means, interfere in the internal politics of candidate countries, unrealistic promises could inadvertently play into the hands of EU-opposing forces and those against the reforms. Therefore, managing the expectations is in the shared interest of both the EU and pro-EU political forces.
The journey to the EU should be seen as an essential part of each candidate country’s national history, and its steps as significant collective societal projects, not just tasks accomplished by bureaucrats and politicians. Otherwise, difficulties on the EU path can quickly become destabilizing factors in already conflict-prone areas. Too often, responsibility is solely attributed to the EU when a country faces challenges, ignoring one’s own role in the situation.
How can older member states influence this? Sharing experiences and fostering people-to-people connections between the older members and the candidate countries through school and university exchanges, and civil society cooperation are vital tools in this effort. Supporting administrations in negotiations is not just “pro-EU enlargement policy” but a pragmatic approach to stabilizing Europe’s neighbouring regions. This has been the EU’s clear stance in the Balkans, but prolonged processes have eroded the credibility of the “EU carrot.” It’s crucial not to let this happen in the eastern neighbourhood if EU enlargement is to remain credible. Otherwise, it would be essential to agree on a multi-speed EU and even internally differentiated integration7 quickly, rather than promising one thing and ultimately offering another as negotiation processes drag on.
Now that the European Council in December 2023 has given a historic political decision on the EU path for Ukraine and Moldova, and surprisingly positive decisions regarding Georgia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the EU faces a serious credibility issue. Although the Council’s conclusions give the Union quite free hands to interpret when the next steps will be taken for these countries, the EU can no longer turn back on its promises. EU leaders emphasized that “relevant actions presented in the Commission’s recommendations must be implemented” before practical steps are taken for Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. The wording for opening membership negotiations with Bosnia-Herzegovina is even more vague, as the EU will await until the “membership criteria are sufficiently met.” Ultimately, the power of interpretation lies in the hands of EU member states.
The identity of the EU has always been based on enlargement. From a small European Coal and Steel Community of six founding members (1951), it has expanded to a union of 27 member states and 436 million inhabitants, with a common foreign and security policy, an annual budget of over 180 billion euros, and almost completely open internal borders. The integration process is a common journey where too easily attained membership can create inequality among countries. Each member must be able to support the EU’s internal growth and deepening integration. In the coming years, the EU’s sustainability and credibility will be tested in a completely new geopolitical climate.
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